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For psychologists and psychotherapists, the notion of forgiveness has been enjoying a substantial vogue. For their patients, it holds the promise of ""moving on"" and healing emotional wounds. The forgiveness of others - and of one's self - would seem to offer the kind of peace that psychotherapy alone has never been able to provide. In this volume, psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. They intend this volume to be a closer, critical look at some of these questions: why… (mais)
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This is a collection of essays, most of them quite good, on the subject of forgiveness. The editors and authors note that forgiveness is quite popular as a subject for therapy, but most of them take a somewhat skeptical view, not dismissing the idea of forgiveness, but questioning whether it should be automatic.
One of my personal favorites is Jerome Neu's “To Understand All is to Forgive All – Or is It?” I have long considered that to be one of the stupidest of clichés. Neu points out that it is a mistranslated and out of context quote from Mme. De Staël. He argues that often when we understand someone's motives, they sometimes turn out to be base, and that we don't blame people whom we consider to be mentally ill, precisely because we don't understand their motives.
A point of departure for many is forgiveness-guru Robert D. Enright's definition of forgiveness “as a "willingness to abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgement and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly hurt us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or her.'” If that is the definition of forgiveness, I am going to be a lot less willing to forgive. Sometimes the only way to avoid a repetition of the offense is to avoid the offender. Sharon Lamb, in her introduction, states that the advocates of unilateral forgiveness, “try to make it clear that forgiveness is not 'condoning' or 'excusing' or 'forgetting' or 'denying'” the behavior, but “in actual practice, forgiveness expressed often fails to communicate to an offender this essential promise.” It is exactly for this reason that in her essay “Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: a Special Case” that she does not advocate automatic forgiveness in cases of abuse. Janice Haaken, in her essay “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural Perspectives on Forgiveness,” adds: “The suspicion is that the valorizing of forgiveness is a seductive ideological cover for baser motives. As oppressed groups gain the strength to speak up and claim new rights, include the right to disengage from abusive relationships, the powerful rediscover the salutary virtue of forgiveness.”
One problem that becomes clear through the essays is that maintaining the distinction between forgiveness and pardon often requires a third party (e.g., the legal system) who metes out justice to the offender even though he/she is forgiven. It is therefore the case that often smaller wrongs, which seem more forgivable, cannot be forgiven, especially not as Enright defines the word, simply because avoiding the unrepentant offender may be the only way to protect oneself, even if one does not remain hostile . Janice Haaken argues: “For therapists who believe in a 'just world' – that emotional suffering is generally brought on by factors under control of the individual – the therapeutic process may focus too narrowly (and oppressively) on the need for a modification in the patient's attitudes.”
Many people believe, for religious reasons, that all offenses must be forgiven, the notion of repentance somehow having gotten lost, and they may not get much out of this book, but those who ponder this issue will find a lot to think about. ( )
Informação do Conhecimento Comum em inglês.Edite para a localizar na sua língua.
This book is dedicated to the memory of Norman S. Care, a distinguished philosopher and a gifted and compassionate teacher.
Primeiras palavras
Informação do Conhecimento Comum em inglês.Edite para a localizar na sua língua.
A few years ago I (a philosopher) read with admiration psychologist Sharon Lamb's book The Trouble with Blame: Victims, Perpetrators, and Responsibility. (Preface, Jeffrie G. Murphy)
Forgiveness is in the air – public figures making public apologies, movies depicting loving kindness offered to murderers, and psychotherapy programs promoting forgiveness in individuals as well as in marital couples. (Introduction, Sharon Lamb)
Citações
Informação do Conhecimento Comum em inglês.Edite para a localizar na sua língua.
The purpose is not to reject or oppose forgiveness but rather to explore some cautions about it – in short, to throw a bit of a wet blanket over trendy forgiveness boosterism. We have all heard the cliché, “To err is human, to forgive divine,” but we need to hear S. J. Perlman's variation on this cliché as well: “To err is human, to forgive supine.” The truth is probably to be found somewhere between the two. (Preface, p. ix)
On an individual basis, what does it really mean to forgive and not pardon but to keep your heart open to another? If that other does not reform, if that other person does not begin to take your perspective into account, it does not promise mental health but instead continued abuse. (Sharon Lamb, “Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: A Special Case,” p.166-167)
And let's face it, it is harder to induce guilt and remorse (negative emotions) in men who batter than to invite love and compassion (positive emotions) in women who have been harmed. (Sharon Lamb, “Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: A Special Case” p.167)
It would seem that it is entirely possible to have compassion for an offender, even your own offender if you have been abused, and not be willing to forgive. While it may be difficult to live with such ambivalent feelings, this is the human condition. (Sharon Lamb, “Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: A Special Case” p.167)
For therapists who believe in a “just world” – that emotional suffering is generally brought on by factors under control of the individual – the therapeutic process may focus too narrowly (and oppressively) on the need for a modification in the patient's attitudes. (Janice Haaken, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural Perspectives on Forgiveness,” p. 182)
The suspicion is that the valorizing of forgiveness is a seductive ideological cover for baser motives. As oppressed groups gain the strength to speak up and claim new rights, include the right to disengage from abusive relationships, the powerful rediscover the salutary virtue of forgiveness. (Janice Haaken, “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural Perspectives on Forgiveness,” p. 184)
Últimas palavras
Informação do Conhecimento Comum em inglês.Edite para a localizar na sua língua.
The truth is probably to be found somewhere between the two. (Preface, Jeffrie G. Murphy)
We hope also to be a resource for those scholars who continue to explore and try to better understand forms of both forgiveness and resentment we encounter in our daily lives. (Introduction, Sharon Lamb)
For psychologists and psychotherapists, the notion of forgiveness has been enjoying a substantial vogue. For their patients, it holds the promise of ""moving on"" and healing emotional wounds. The forgiveness of others - and of one's self - would seem to offer the kind of peace that psychotherapy alone has never been able to provide. In this volume, psychologist Sharon Lamb and philosopher Jeffrie Murphy argue that forgiveness has been accepted as a therapeutic strategy without serious, critical examination. They intend this volume to be a closer, critical look at some of these questions: why
One of my personal favorites is Jerome Neu's “To Understand All is to Forgive All – Or is It?” I have long considered that to be one of the stupidest of clichés. Neu points out that it is a mistranslated and out of context quote from Mme. De Staël. He argues that often when we understand someone's motives, they sometimes turn out to be base, and that we don't blame people whom we consider to be mentally ill, precisely because we don't understand their motives.
A point of departure for many is forgiveness-guru Robert D. Enright's definition of forgiveness “as a "willingness to abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgement and indifferent behavior toward one who unjustly hurt us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or her.'” If that is the definition of forgiveness, I am going to be a lot less willing to forgive. Sometimes the only way to avoid a repetition of the offense is to avoid the offender. Sharon Lamb, in her introduction, states that the advocates of unilateral forgiveness, “try to make it clear that forgiveness is not 'condoning' or 'excusing' or 'forgetting' or 'denying'” the behavior, but “in actual practice, forgiveness expressed often fails to communicate to an offender this essential promise.” It is exactly for this reason that in her essay “Women, Abuse, and Forgiveness: a Special Case” that she does not advocate automatic forgiveness in cases of abuse. Janice Haaken, in her essay “The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Psychoanalytic and Cultural Perspectives on Forgiveness,” adds: “The suspicion is that the valorizing of forgiveness is a seductive ideological cover for baser motives. As oppressed groups gain the strength to speak up and claim new rights, include the right to disengage from abusive relationships, the powerful rediscover the salutary virtue of forgiveness.”
One problem that becomes clear through the essays is that maintaining the distinction between forgiveness and pardon often requires a third party (e.g., the legal system) who metes out justice to the offender even though he/she is forgiven. It is therefore the case that often smaller wrongs, which seem more forgivable, cannot be forgiven, especially not as Enright defines the word, simply because avoiding the unrepentant offender may be the only way to protect oneself, even if one does not remain hostile . Janice Haaken argues: “For therapists who believe in a 'just world' – that emotional suffering is generally brought on by factors under control of the individual – the therapeutic process may focus too narrowly (and oppressively) on the need for a modification in the patient's attitudes.”
Many people believe, for religious reasons, that all offenses must be forgiven, the notion of repentance somehow having gotten lost, and they may not get much out of this book, but those who ponder this issue will find a lot to think about. ( )