The also-ran of the ETO; Operation Dragoon doesn’t get much respect. Author William Breuer has written an adequate, workmanlike history. There had been Allied proposals to invade southern France all the way back to 1942, but the plans weren’t settled until late July, 1944, with the invasion scheduled for August 15. The British – and some Americans, notably Mark Clark – were vehemently against the idea, holding out for a continued advance in Italy or an amphibious invasion of the Balkans. The shortage of LSTs meant that only three divisions (US 3rd Infantry, US 36th Infantry, and US 45th Infantry) would hit the beaches on D-Day, with the French 1st Armored landing the next day. Outlying islands and gun batteries were to be attached by specialist units, the US-Canadian 1st Special Service Force and the 1er Commando Français de l'Afrique du Nord. A considerable airborne force was involved, but unlike Normandy there were no division-level units involved; instead an assortment of independent parachute and glider units was assembled, including some “straight leg” artillery and anti-tank units that had never even seen a glider before. The Germans were well aware something was up, as Luftwaffe reconnaissance had picked up the naval assembly area and the German army in Italy had noticed units withdrawn from the front; southern France was believed to be the most likely target although the Genoa area was also considered to be a possibility. The opposing German units in Army Group G were almost all static divisions, mostly Volksdeutsch or Osttrüppen, eventually leading to the same problem the Wehrmacht had in Normandy; Russians in France were unwilling to fight Americans on behalf of Germany. The only mobile unit available was 11th Panzer, but that was in Bordeaux, two days from the battlefield, and was understrength. Nevertheless there were a lot of minefields, barbed wire, and beach obstacles.


The airborne assault was almost a disaster. Heavy ground fog covered the drop zones on the morning of August 15th, troop carrier pilots couldn’t identify landmarks, and the paratroops and gliders landed up to 20 miles off target (the village of Le Muy, an important road junction). To a certain extent this worked to the Allies’ advantage; small groups of red-blooded American boys left up to their own devices in a foreign country did what red-blooded American boys often do under such circumstances, especially red-blooded American boys equipped with weapons and satchel charges: engaged in acts of random vandalism. They cut telephone wires, blew up bridges, and shot up German motorcycle couriers and staff cars, leading to reports of Americans all over southern France and paralyzing German response. Le Muy was eventually captured, although at heavier cost than if the drops had been on target. The commando assaults were also less than ideal; a threatening naval battery turned out to have dummy guns made out of sewer pipe and the French commandoes walked into a minefield that had been laid after the last reconnaissance report they had received from the Resistance. There were some minor naval actions (more than at Normandy, though) involving Allied destroyers and PT boats versus various German small vessels.


The main amphibious attacks went well, however, with the main resistance coming from minefields rather than German troops. Although 11th Panzer set out for the battlefield it was savaged by fighter-bombers and never contributed. Now reinforced by the French 1st Armored the Allies drove on Marseilles and Toulon; eventually Hitler gave the order to evacuate France and pull back to the Siegfried Line. Dragoon has to be considered a success; eventually one third of Allied supplies for the ETO came through the Mediterranean rather than the Channel or Atlantic coasts.


Breuer is an amateur historian with a number of military histories to his credit; his main flaw is he tends to write like a journalist (he was a newspaper publisher) rather than a historian. Thus we get introduced to various individuals in the armies for “slice of life” accounts, and Breuer tends to telegraph his punches, often informing us when they are first introduced that Sgt. Doe or Corporal Jones is going to buy the farm in France while Private Smith will go on to raise a family back in Texas. Breuer also concentrates heavily on the Americans; the French attack on the harbors is relegated to a short epilogue and all the Germans except higher officers are nameless Feldgrau (that’s Breuer’s usual term; perhaps “Krauts” was considered insensitive). There’s no follow-up discussion on whether the whole thing was a good idea (other than what you can draw from the general text). The maps are inadequate; there’s a general map of the beaches but no detail that would allow the reader to connect things with descriptions in the text. The airborne component maps appear to be taken from original planning documents, including the route from Italy to the drop zones and the drop zones themselves; unfortunately these were the planned drop zones, not where the airborne troops actually ended up. The photograph section is mostly portraits of the various commanders involved rather than action shots (although there’s an evocative set of four taken from the pocket of a dead German soldier; they show young men in field grey on maneuvers, drinking in a bistro, and getting lunch at a field kitchen, much the same as young men in khaki or olive drab might do. Where have all the soldiers gone, indeed). Despite these shortcomings, Operation Dragoon is a useful and readable account of one of the more obscure WWII campaigns. ( )