O livro tenta explicar o inexplicável pela ótica míope da história. A psicologia falha ao destrinchar o fenômeno. Sugiro aos amantes do tema que leiam os livros da editora Madras sobre o nazismo. "Há mais coisas entre o céu e a terra..." ( )

I've reviewed this book here. ( )

Interesting, not too long (~300 small pages plus notes) biography of Hitler as a leader. Incorporates a lot of recent research, some of which surprised me. Okay, it probably shouldn't surprise me that Mein Kampf is completely unreliable on Hitler's early life, but it still surprised me to learn that the latest view is that Hitler had no particular political views until after World War I.

More surprising is that Hitler had no settled political views in his first ventures into politics. He actually briefly flirted with leftism before switching to the right when it looked like the right was going to come out on top in 1919 Munich.

Most of the focus is on the nature of charismatic leadership. It originally meant someone touched by the gods, but it's surprising how well the basically atheistic Hitler fits the pattern. The charismatic leader doesn't necessarily have that much personal charm; but his confidence in his own mission, combined with his strength of will, combined with his distance from the common man (here Hitler's psychopathology actually worked in his favor) all create a myth that leads to a preference cascade that puts the leader on top. (Rees doesn't actually use the term "preference cascade", but it seems a good label for the phenomenon he describes.)

The myth was only reinforced by Hitler's early successes, which made him wildly popular among Germans who otherwise had little liking for Nazi philosophy. In fact, one of the most common memes running around Nazi Germany was that Hitler would put a stop to the various annoyances, and worse, of the Nazi Party "if he only knew."

Stalingrad really shook this faith in Hitler. Yet Hitler remained in power, because the German atrocities more or less bound the German people to him. Losing the war was unthinkable, because of the prospect of the Allies (particulary the Russians) taking savage retribution, so there was considerable incentive to believe that somehow Hitler really still knew best and would somehow work the impossible.

An interesting thesis of the book is that Hitler's charisma contributed significantly to the victory over France, not only because of its effects on the Germans, but because of its effects on the Allies, who were so shattered by the Ardennes breakthrough that they bought into the myth a little bit themselves and believed counterattack was futile. Those who did not nevertheless reacted too slowly, because what the German Army was doing was so preposterously risky that they couldn't believe the Germans were actually doing it until it was done.

It all ends in the bunker, of course, when the top Nazi leadership finally started running out on Hitler, and here Rees borrows a delightful turn of expression from Sir Ian Kershaw: It was the rare case of the sinking ship abandoning the rat.

Highly recommended. ( )

Mais comment? (et là le comment peut se rapprocher du pourquoi?) Comment ça a marché? Quel est le truc? Ou bien, en grande partie, Hitler disaient ce que ses auditeur voulaient (pouvaient) entendre... ( )

Whether you agree with all his arguments and points, this is a good addition to the World War II reading collection. Very clearly written and well organized though a little repetitive in spots. Does a good job with the intricate diplomatic situation, and full of good anecdotes that I had never seen before. ( )