Zeev Schiff (1932–2007)

This book was written in 1989, not long after the first Intifada started. It shows the complexity of the uprising, its mass character but also the several militant organizations that tried to direct it. From the acts of terrorism of the Islamic Jihad, to the mob rule of the Fatah shabiba (youngsters), the Unified National Command, dominated by left-wing militants, the newly-born HAMAS, the PLO in the territories and abroad, the Popular Committees, the Palestinian "notables", the pro-Jordanian forces, the merchants and the common people. It shows the inter-relations between them during the first two years of the Intifada, and their disagreements regarding the path to follow. It also presents the Israeli angle, with the sharp disagreements regarding the correct strategy to quell, the broken ilusions (or delusions) regarding the fate of the territories, and the beginnings of Israel problems with the media.

The book authors are clear-headed and in spite of writing so close to the events (actually, the Intifada continued for three more years), they had already aprehended the outline of the new situation and its consequences for Israel.

Several important points the authors make:

1. Already before the Intifada, Israel's Civil Administration had surrendered control of Gaza strip institutions, and large swaths of its population. It was too dangerous for the routine job of school inspectors and the like, and in a sense, the Palestinians gained a degree of independence before the Intifada even started. Those right-wing Israelis who look to the period before the Intifada as a golden age, should remember that the IDF already bypassed dangerous junctions, the Civil Administration was blind and powerless in Gaza and in no way the situation could be described as under control.

2. While that was true of Gaza, Jerusalem was another story. Before the Intifada, Israel controlled East Jerusalem and 19 surrounding villages (120.000 Palestinians) with a force of only 150 policemen. But as soon as the disturbances started there, Israel was forced to reinforce this puny force with the army. The Intifada redivided the city and showed that its unity was artificial.

3. The Intifada changed completely the parameters of Israel's security situation, creating a third front inside the country. As the authors said: "From a marginal task handled by a small, lean apparatus, the occupation became Israel's national obsession".

4. The Intifada woke up Israelis to the fact of the existence of the Palestinians. They were invisible before, not just because Israelis were deluded in thinking that the Palestinians didn't have political aspirations, but because very few Israelis were actually aware of the Palestinians in the territories. The IDF wasn't in charge of the occupation before the Intifada, only the border police. Most Israeli soldiers had never had to deal with the Palestinians during their conscription service. Suddenly, enormous amounts of young soldiers and reservists were sent to the territories to do a police work against a mass uprising, without even the necessary equipment to disperse protests.

5. And when the soldiers finally got the equipment (tear gas, clubs, helmets) the corruption that was latent in the occupation became prominent, and the excesses and abuses became common. The morality of the Israeli army suffered a terrible blow.

6. But since the Intifada could not be solved only by military means, it brought a change in the settlers' attitude towards the army, which they accused of not doing enough. Settlers' abuse against the IDF became widespread, while Israelis politicians also tried to deflect their blame towards the army.

7. The book also shows how the PLO abroad maneuvered to subdue the local leadership for fear of being sidelined, threatening those leaders that did not bow to it.

The book also dispels some common anti-Zionist myths like the accusation that Israel created the HAMAS, or that there was an united Palestinian front against Israel. Each Palestinian movement had different aims and almost a fifht of the Palestinians were casualties at the hands of other Palestinians.

It is an indispensable book to understand the unfolding of this central event that changed the Israeli Arab conflict in a way that has made a return to the situation before 1987 completely impossible.… (mais)