Ian Kershaw

Some years ago before joining Goodreads, I read the very long first volume of this 'biography', and only recall now its length, thoroughness and the fact that it was a bit dry at times. I came across this second volume recently which takes up the narrative from the point where Hitler had taken power.

The book, like volume 1, is more an explanation of the various social and political forces within Germany which led to such a person being put into power and then becoming completely central to an abnormally run state in which officials tried to "work towards the Fuehrer" by anticipating and carrying out his wishes without needing actual authorisation, often competing and clashing. Hitler, meanwhile, was governed by twin manias: the need to expand Germany's "living space" and the drive to remove - initially by emigration or deportation, and later on by extermination - those elements of the population he viewed as undesirables: chiefly the Jews, but also Gypsies, mentally handicapped, Communists and others. While presiding over mass murder, he took care to distance himself from it, though his constant generalisations against the Jews in particular inspired his subordinates to carry out his wishes. Kershaw describes the mindset which, contrary to any reasonable person's view, saw powerless victims as all-powerful enemies, but does not attempt to explain it.

Hitler's 'talent', as the author sees it, was for detecting the weaknesses of others, including heads of other states, and taking all-or-nothing gambles: until 1941, those paid off, and he had the almost 100% support of his military leaders and most of the general public. But the ultimate gamble, of attacking the Soviet Union, which he completely underestimated, was the one where it all started to unravel. Given his inability to admit any fault, he then scapegoated the Jews or his military chiefs for the repeated reversals. As the situation worsened, his paranoia spiraled until he distrusted the Army chiefs, in particular, and repeatedly sacked them. His megalomania was such that if Germany lost the war, it would prove the German people were unworthy of him and should perish with him.

For such a huge volume there were surprisingly few typographical errors other than a couple of repeated words such as 'the the' and an odd tendency in the first few chapters to use 'imply' and 'infer' incorrectly. Some of the wording is a little turgid, such as 'the implication to imply', but on the whole, the book was interesting and had some surprises: I hadn't known that the conspirators against Hitler had made other attempts before the one where they planted the bomb at the planning meeting. The one thing that this (and as far as I recall, volume 1 was the same) does not do is give a real insight into why Hitler was the way he was or try to give any psychological explanation for views which turned reality on its head. So I would rate this a 4-star read.… (mais)

A systematic look at the way Hitler’s image was formed and used before and during WWII. Kershaw’s conclusion claims the circumstances are unique enough and the result extraordinary enough never to be replicated - not sure about that one. His approach is sometimes a bit scattershot in using individuals as representatives for whole regions or social groups, much in the same way you’d see quotes used in Civil War to give an authentic ring to the historian’s narrative about the war. Actual quantitative measurements are few, necessarily, and by the nature of the oppressive state any data from the period is suspect (dissenters were unlikely to voice said dissent through large periods).
The most striking part of the story was seeing how Hitler managed his image relative to the audience. The early rabid antisemitism he used in gaining control of the party dies down as he faces the mainstream public and eventually rules the nation. Antisemitism is left to the underlings. Likewise is all the bad news, Hitler appearing only with some message of victory or hope, programming a pavlovian response to his image almost, making people crave reassurance from the Führer when the war stars to go badly. It also seems to have fueled a compensatory narrative that wasn’t a designed propaganda message; that whenever things went wrong, someone had let him down (rather than any incompetence in the leadership).
You can see these mental gymnastics in some war memoirs from the nazi side like [b:Berlins sista timmar - En svensk SS-soldats berättelse om slutstriden|15729712|Berlins sista timmar - En svensk SS-soldats berättelse om slutstriden|Thorolf Hillblad|https://i.gr-assets.com/images/S/compressed.photo.goodreads.com/books/1341076217l/15729712._SY75_.jpg|849511] (Ragnarok in english).… (mais)