Michael R. Gordon

The Publisher describes "The End Game" as an ambitious, authoritative and complete description of the Iraq war. This book picks up where the author's earlier book, "Cobra II", which details how we found our way into the war in Iraq, left off. In this latter book, "The End Game" covers the Iraq war primarily from 2006 through 2012, and uses extensive information from U.S. military leaders, politicians, the State Department, Sunni and Sh'ia leaders, as well as insights from Kurdish leaders and lower level Iraqi leaders.

For historians, or those truly seeking insights into all the decisions and policies which compounded the difficulties in turning Iraq back to the Iraqis, all the details are here. However to me, the book was overly ambitious, overly detailed, and the political turmoil and Iraqi political infighting descriptions became mind numbing. For someone more interested in a general overview, the length of this book may be a negative. Personally, I appreciated many of the insights, but overall, I found the book somewhat tedious to finish.
… (mais)

We Weep; those of us who supported the decision to invade Iraq and those of us who did not.

The authors present the pageant of blunders that is the Iraq War. This is a disheartening account of the decisions and events that has led us to where we are today. Whether you supported the initial decision to invade or not, the questions before all of us today, are what do we do now, and what must be done to resolve the Iraq dilemma. To address these decisions we must have some understanding of what happened. Mr. Gordon and General Trainor have compiled a detailed and rigorous account of the miscalculations, misconceptions, misjudgments, misunderstandings and misstatements by both civilian and military leaders. Though the authors have gone to extraordinary lengths to be dispassionate and unbiased, they have named names and shown no favoritism in recounting disastrous decisions and their resultant consequences. Their account will fill you with sadness and rage. Perhaps that is where we need to begin to extricate ourselves from this nightmare. I highly recommend this book.… (mais)

Published in 1995, this book still belongs to that initial wave of Desert Storm publications, although this work's four-year separation from the events it describes allows the authors to include commentary on the wave of celebrity autobiographies and events that immediately followed the end of the war in February 1991. The authors are the New York Times Pentagon correspondent Michael Gordon and the Times former military correspondent and retired Marine Corps Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor. Their professionalism and level of military knowledge easily allows this work to rise above the bulk of their contemporary Desert Storm storytellers and makes for good reading for students of military history.

Gordon and Trainor tell the story of the Persian Gulf War in two parts with 20 chapters total, along with an epilogue, endnotes, acknowledgements and an index. The book is arranged chronologically. The endnotes are particularly well-detailed and usefully augment the information in the text. The book's perspective is from the 30,000 foot level, meaning that the authors concentrated their efforts on the story of senior leadership during the conflict, seldom diving below brigade level. This is in contrast to Rick Atkinson's "Crusade", whose story ranged up and down the entire chain of command.

The authors focus on decision-making, and they spare none of the major players, despite the prior publication of their self-serving autobiographies. General H. Norman Schawarzkopf, Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command, falls under a particularly critical eye, as well he should. The nation was not served well when Schwarzkopf was placed at the helm of CENTCOM, the thinking being that the isolated command was the safest place to put a cantankerous four-star in 1989, but the events of 1990 and 1991 proved to be above his skill level and personality. CINCCENT is not the only player given this detailed analysis, but he is the most noticeable. While there was no question on how Desert Storm would end militarily, one could not say the same about the politics, both domestic and international. It is readily apparent that Desert Storm's unsatisfactory conclusion set the stage for Operation Iraqi Freedom a dozen years later.

Overall this book is a great read written by authors with classical views of military history who did great research and interviews. My only complaint is that the maps are not in sync with the description of Iraqi military units given in the text.… (mais)