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Carregando... The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesmande Warren F. Kimball
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Here Warren Kimball explores Roosevelt's vision of the postwar world by laying out the nature and development of FDR's "war aims"--his long-range political goals. As the face of eastern Europe and the world changes before our eyes, Roosevelt's goals, dismissed during the Cold War as impractical, seem less unrealistic today. Não foram encontradas descrições de bibliotecas. |
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Google Books — Carregando... GênerosClassificação decimal de Dewey (CDD)940.53History and Geography Europe Europe 1918- World War IIClassificação da Biblioteca do Congresso dos E.U.A. (LCC)AvaliaçãoMédia:
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This project of identifying FDR's "basic assumptions" can encompass both the ideological proclivities engendered by the capitalist political economy (as seen in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms) and the practical considerations of power politics (as seen in his attempt to engineer a postwar order). Because of this elasticity, Kimball can go beyond the dichotomy between revisionism and internationalism identified by Cole in his overview. The strength of this collection results from its value as a synthesis.
One example of Kimball's approach to FDR's foreign policy, the addressed in "Roosevelt and the Postwar World" illustrates very well Kimball's discovery of Roosevelt's assumptions at work. Fearing an uncooperative Stalin would spoil his grand vision of a postwar world policed by the "Four Powers." FDR held Churchill at bay at Tehran and courted Stalin instead. Both Roosevelt (at Tehran) and Cordell Hull (at Moscow) refused to discuss specifics on Eastern Europe and Poland. These actions speak louder than words, revealing Roosevelt's assumption that "Woodrow Wilson had the right idea - stability and security (peace and prosperity?) for the United States can be achieved only on a worldwide scale. Peace is indivisible, or so the phrase goes. But Wilson erred in being too structured, too specific, too inflexible, too unwilling to be practical and accept the realities of great power relations" (p. 187.)
Though FDR never came out and said that he was attempting to implement a "Wilsonian vision" using practical means, his actions aimed at keeping Stalin within "The Family Circle" clearly indicate as much.