This is a book which publicizes the work of Special Forces in Okinawa, Laos, Thailand and Cambodia during the years of 1956-1975. The aim of the book is to highlight the effectiveness of these numerically inferior soldiers. More often than not, it serves to illustrate the failures of the military strategists who, could not or would not, adapt to immediate battlefield conditions nor have an overall plan which didn't squander the caliber of men sent on these perilous assignments. I consider this more of a reference book which puts into print the life work of many men who would have otherwise gone noticed. The author himself considers the book hardly more than a start of the longer SF story. Stanton implies that in 1985 (publish date) classification restrictions also limited what could be said. By 2010, more has been published in various first person memoirs. I found no overarching narrative which made the reading seem repetitive even when it went over new material. I would have liked to known what the official position between the CIA and Special Forces was. I would have liked to have clearly heard what Westmoreland's, Abrams' or McNamara's plans were from the Special Forces point of view. Other than avoiding unfavorable public opinion, that is (p. 268). Training security forces, strategic hamlets, Vietnamization, I did not find anything objectively presentable as a consistent rationale for SF. Maybe it is impossible to state, after all? 8 pages of b/w photos, maps, Index, Special Forces MIAs, Special Forces Medal of Honor winners, charts, bibliography. ( )