There perhaps could not be a more timely and relevant book to see publication than Who Lost Russia: How the World Entered a New Cold War, by Peter Conradi. As this review is written, friction between the United States and Russia is currently at levels not witnessed since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The sound of saber-rattling echoes from potential flashpoints across the globe. Russia has annexed Crimea–which resulted in loud condemnation from the West as well as crippling economic sanctions–and actively sponsors civil war in Ukraine through its support of two breakaway self-proclaimed republics, much as it has done in Georgia, another former Soviet state, but with greater vigor and less restraint.
President Vladimir Putin has remade his role as an elected official in an emerging democracy into that of an iron-fisted old-style autocrat, and seeks to refashion Russia into a key actor in the global arena once more. Relying on a toolkit that includes political and economic intimidation, misinformation campaigns and election meddling, a newly resurgent Russia is actively reasserting itself with states once part of the Soviet Union, with former allies, and in efforts directed at destabilizing the Western alliance. Russia has intervened in Syria, a traditional Soviet ally, ostensibly to fight ISIL but in fact to prop up the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad, putting it at direct odds with US interests in a highly unstable region. A new American President won the White House under a cloud of suspicion as it has become increasingly clear not only that Russia intervened in the election, but that it did so to promote Donald Trump. Twin committees in both houses of Congress are currently investigating whether there was active collusion between the Trump campaign and Russia. Trump himself seems struck with a kind of boyhood admiration of Putin and his brand of authoritarianism, which may or may not have been put to the test when he ordered a missile strike on a Syrian airbase. Russia seems unfazed, brandishing its military might, leaving spy ships lingering off the American coast, and buzzing American fighter jets. It’s almost like a flashback to the 1960s.
But, as Peter Conradi reminds us with this insightful and well-written study, it did not start off that way, and perhaps it did not have to come to this. Conradi, foreign editor of the UK’s The Sunday Times, and thus absent the bias that seems to inform the outlook of Americans from all ends of the political spectrum, revisits the collapse of the Soviet Union–which he witnessed first-hand as a foreign correspondent in Moscow–and the heady optimism that came along with it in Europe and the United States. The world marveled at unfolding events then, cheering on first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin, as the fear of nuclear annihilation gave way to the welcoming of Russia to a community of nations predicated upon democracy and a market economy. Few in the West paid much attention as a similar, initial buoyancy within Russia itself rapidly deteriorated into a growing sense of humiliation as shell-shocked citizens came to grips with their new status. No longer a superpower, stripped of vast territories–including Ukraine and the Central Asian republics–that were historically part of Greater Russia, the dawn of democracy and capitalism brought to a much-diminished state political uncertainty and economic chaos, along with crime and corruption. It was this Russia that with a mixture of hope and shame held out its hands to a West that championed its rebirth and rewarded it with … a loan package insufficient to truly stabilize the economy, thunderous encouragement, and very little else.
In a fast-moving, highly articulate narrative that neatly blends the arts of historian and journalist, Conradi recounts events and assigns historical context that is frequently overlooked, with an eye for analysis that is largely unblemished by typical Western bias. The author underscores that it was the USSR–in its manic attempt to create fictional Soviet republics with faux autonomy within the historic Greater Russia–that encouraged secession when the Soviet Union dissolved. Ukraine had been a part of Russia for hundreds of years. So too was Crimea, which was only ceremoniously gifted to Ukraine in 1954, when it had almost no practical significance. Today Russian nationalists look upon these former territories and others as the “near abroad,” and demand to have a say in their respective destinies. These points are not made to justify recent Russian aggression, but to place them in the appropriate context, something often conspicuous in its absence in media coverage.
I noted before the advantage of Conradi as a non-American observer. I am reminded of the distorted perspective in the United States every time a partisan or pundit acclaims Reagan for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, which in fact he had little to do with. (Historian Richard Reeves credits Reagan only for insisting, against the advice of his inner circle, that Gorbachev’s reforms were genuine and that he deserved to be reckoned with. While that certainly merits significance, it hardly translates into winning the Cold War.) Conradi’s thesis, which he argues convincingly, is that it was this kind of loud triumphalism in the West, coupled with an aggressive expansion of NATO to the edges of the Russian border, that drove the relationship in the last two and a half decades to its current state of confrontation. He does not speak as an apologist of Putin and his increasing belligerence. Far from it. He recognizes Putin as the amoral autocrat that he is, murdering or jailing rivals and opponents alike, presiding over the dismantling of democratic institutions and–as the emerging agent of realpolitik projecting power over a reasserted Russian sphere of influence–a true threat to the Western community of nations. But he also suggests that it was the various missteps by the West–and the mishandling of the fledgling new Russia that emerged from the ashes of the USSR–that set the stage for someone like Putin to seize power and sustain overwhelming support from the populace.
I am old enough to recall the terror that gripped our home during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “duck-and-cover” drills in elementary school, and the flawed domino theory that led to the tragedy of Vietnam. We all expected that Iron Curtain to define the next century, but then one day it turned out that the Soviet Union was simply one massive Potemkin Village, a fact that had somehow eluded us all along despite billions of dollars spent on intelligence gathering, and only made manifest as it imploded before our wondering eyes. One day, unexpectedly, the USSR simply went out of business.
I watched that happen too, and what followed, through the pages of the New York Times. I recall bemoaning that such momentous historical events–the fall of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, the rise of new states from the ashes of the old Soviet Union and its dramatic aftermath–unfolded with Oval Office occupants, first George H.W. Bush and then Bill Clinton, who seemed to lack the vision to shape the future that lay ahead. Who Lost Russia appears to underscore my anecdotal observations as the author points to a series of lost opportunities under a succession of American Presidents. He also notes that along with tone-deaf triumphalism there was a consistent, pronounced arrogance that failed to accord proper respect to Russia and its security concerns. This was, of course, evident in the expansion of NATO to include not only former Warsaw Pact allies but also former Soviet Republics in the Baltic states, the unilateral abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty, and the very real possibility that what were once integral parts of Russia–Georgia, Ukraine, and especially the critically strategic Crimean Peninsula–were lining up as NATO candidates that could serve as hosts to missiles pointed at Moscow. It was within this context that Putin acted on the Crimea.
Conradi also reminds us that initially Putin’s Russia objected but largely accepted NATO expansion. That Putin himself offered strategic airspace as support to George W. Bush in the aftermath of 911, and did not balk when the US invaded Afghanistan, a site of the last foreign adventure of the USSR where much blood and treasure was expended. It was only the invasion and occupation of Iraq by the United States that finally cut a deep fault line in Russian-American relations, as Putin branded this a calculated act of foreign aggression. Few outside of the United States would disagree with this characterization.
Conradi goes on to objectively chronicle the failed “reset” efforts by President Obama and his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, noting that Obama, like those before him, seemed plainly unaware of what really went to the heart of Russia’s concerns. The author appears to disapprove of Obama’s absence of decisive action in Syria, which no doubt signaled weakness to Putin, yet he neglects to advance an available option that would have avoided exacerbating the multiplicity of competing conflicts on the ground there. Perhaps, I would suggest, doing nothing is better than decisively doing the wrong thing.
It is disconcerting that an unschooled and unpredictable man now sits in the White House as the prospect of nuclear war again looms before us. Conradi’s account of the wrong turns taken by his better qualified predecessors leaves us little room for optimism. Who Lost Russia is a brilliant book that should be required reading for those who have the current President’s ear. Our only opportunity to offset disaster is to carefully review what has once again set us on the brink.


[Note: I read an ARC (Advance Reader’s Copy) of this book as part of an early reviewer’s program, but the book is hot off the press as of April 11, 2017. Buy it and read it!]

My latest review, “Who Lost Russia: How the World Entered a New Cold War,” by Peter Conradi, is live on my book blog: https://regarp.com/2017/04/30/who-lost-russia-how-the-world-entered-a-new-cold-w... ( )

In this book by Mr. Conradi which he based on interviews with people on both sides of the new and widning political divide, Peter Conradi clearly shows one the failure of understanding on both sides over the past twenty-five years and outlines how we can get relations back on track before it's too late.
When the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991 it appeared to usher in a new period of possible peace and co-operation with the West. This, we were told by the Western democracies politicians was the end of cold war history and now the entire world would totally engage with a profound sense of enlightenment and values of liberal democracy.
Reality proved very different. Russia came out from the 1990s battered, humiliated, its military rusting in port and depots, its protests for help ignored as NATO expanded eastwards to take in Moscow's former satellites. Vladimir Putin offered a new start when he took the place of the erratic and often enibriated Boris Yeltsin in the Kremlin.Putin ever the KGB agent was determined to restore his country's bruised pride and he has wrongly directed the West with his incursions into Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. As NATO and the West now yet again come to terms with a Russia which believes it has been at war with the West since 2014, the risks of catastrophic mistakes and the potential for a huge catastrophe have not been higher since the end of the Cold War. Who Lost Russia? by Peter Conradi sshows the reader with a clear view and with a dedicated precision. Understanding a situation is always needed to develop a proper strategy. This book provides that level of understanding and should be a mandatory reading especially for our current political leadership in Washington, and the world policy makers who support them. ( )

A highly readable narrative about U.S. - Russian relations since the last days of the Soviet Union to the present. The author doesn't appear to have done original or archival research, but provides a solid journalistic account of recent history that suddenly matters a great deal.

Back in the 1950s, the debate in US politics was over 'who lost China,' a reference to the possible opportunity the US had to make China an ally when instead they sided with the Soviets. Today, Peter Conradi says, we can ask ourselves 'who lost Russia?'

When the Iron Curtain fell and the Soviet Union began to crumble at the end of the 1980s, it was felt that we had an opportunity to make an ally of a long-time foe. Unfortunately, although the relationship between the two countries warmed considerably, there were still profound differences in the way each saw the world. The US thought of Russia as a defeated country, whereas the Russians still believed they were significant and entitled to influence within their former sphere of power.

I've never paid very close attention to stories of Russia in the news, so this book was extremely eye-opening. In the early 90s, efforts between Gorbachev and Bush were tentative; the Russian economy was a disaster and there was still a lot of suspicion on the American side. Yeltsin and Clinton, on the other hand, developed a warm personal relationship, but it was based very much on 'looking the other way' when it came to Russian corruption in the government. Likewise, Putin and Bush initially had a great deal of respect for one another, but Putin was offended when Bush ignored his objections to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. And Obama was never able to establish a relationship of any level of trust with Putin, instead appearing weak with his "reset" plan. Conradi says: "It is difficult to pinpoint the precise moment at which relations between Russia and the West went wrong. In fact, it may be that there was never a moment at which they were going right."

This was an extremely fascinating book, and is very important for anyone hoping to understand the current situation between the two countries (especially on a morning when I learn we just launched cruise missiles against Syria - which is possibly very significant to what's left of the relationship). It's complex and Conradi points out that there is enough blame to go around - US, Russian, and EU leaders all had unfortunate missteps. And perhaps, just like the situation with China in 1949, perhaps Russia was never really ours to lose. (I rec'd an advance copy of this book from the publisher through LibraryThing.) ( )

It seems to me that the very title of this book contains a false premise. Was Russia ever actually "ours" to lose? Americans are so convinced by our own propaganda that our system is the envy of the entire world and the only reasonable way to run a modern nation that we find it inconceivable that anyone can believe differently. This is particularly ironic given that the final chapter of this book details the uncertainty caused by the election of Donald Trump. Our perfect system has somehow chosen an utterly unpredictable leader with little experience in governance, who may actually have achieved office partially as a result of Russian interference in our election. Not exactly an sterling example of "see what you're missing by not becoming a fully democratic Western nation."

That said, _Who Lost Russia?_ seems to be a competent survey of the personalities and events of the past few decades in terms of the relationship between the leaders of Russia and the leaders of the US. I have read allegations form expatriate Russians that American countries "looted" Russian resources in the period following the fall of the USSR. I would have liked to see some discussion of these issues. There are also sources far more skeptical of America's role in destabilizing the Ukraine than Conradi seems to be. Americans seem reluctant to admit that different nations can have opposing goals and even more difficulty seeing that other nations will, when possible, pursue their goals without reference to ours. Somehow it seemed totally reasonable that American missiles in Turkey could strike Moscow, but outrageous and not to be borne that the USSR should place missiles in Cuba that could reach America. Similarly, we expect a free hand dealing with Central and S. America while portraying Russia as an international bully for wanting to control Georgia or Ukraine. It isn't that either is right or wrong; it's just the way the world works. Powerful nations expect to control their client states, directly or indirectly.

The book itself is as clearly written as one can expect a tome filled with unfamiliar names and places to be. A few charts or even simple timelines of changing personnel would have been helpful. ( )