Rob Wilson (2) (1965–)

This is a fascinating account of the coalition negotiations in May of this year, put together from interviews with key players on all sides. It is structured chronologically: a chapter on Preparations, then a chapter for each day (Friday 7th May to Tuesday 11 May), ending with the acceptance by LibDems of the coalition agreement, and the appointment of a new Cabinet. A Postscript provides a longer-term view of the implications of the coalition for all parties and the country.

The author, though a serving Conservative MP, has made a good effort to report rather than opine, and to distinguish between the two (he gets most opinionated in the Postscript). He has the advantage of telling a story which is intrinsically exciting. It's filled with quotes and little details: texts flying back and forth between and across party lines, biscuits and coffees in the negotiating rooms, aides running back and forth hand-delivering draft documents, culture clashes and back-channel communications.

As well as the basics of what-happened-when, it serves as a good example of selective memory and spin, with different people telling things different ways. Accounts of meetings between Conservatives and LibDems are generally in agreement, accounts of meetings between Labour and LibDems often diverge, especially the accounts of the three meetings between each party's negotiation teams. This of course mirrors the relative leakiness of each set of negotiations at the time, with Lib-Con negotiations staying tightly under wraps, while Lib-Lab talks were being briefed against almost from the start.

On the Lib-Lab talks, Mandelson, Balls, et al insist Labour were being constructive and the LibDems sabotaged the talks by being arrogant and pushy, strongly suggesting the negotiating team were ideologically opposed to Labour. Laws, Alexander et al insist they were constructive, Labour were ill-prepared, divided, and not taking negotiations seriously. Of course the spin is to the benefit of current party positions, and possibly even reflects internal party jockeying. Where you can't reconcile two versions, I think it has to come down to who you are more inclined to believe.

I can't help thinking that the very serious, prepared approach of the Conservatives may have led the LibDem team to expect something similar from Labour, and act accordingly. I can see how that could be taken as being arrogant and pushy by an unprepared team which had expected LibDems to want to support Labour. The Conservative decision to take the LibDems seriously didn't just benefit their own negotiations: it set a bar which the Labour team just couldn't meet. The LibDems had a negotiating team appointed by Nick Clegg in late 2009; Osborne put together a "just in case" Conservative team about 2 weeks before the election; meanwhile Ed Balls found out there was a Labour negotiating team and he was in it late on Saturday morning, with the first secret meeting at 3pm that day.

Though generally well-written and accessible, the book has a few flaws. Sometimes information is repeated within the same page, occasionally even the same paragraph. There's a lot of dwelling on the merits and flaws of the statements released by each party, especially on the Friday, but no text of these statements to refer to. An appendix of the public statements and speeches would have been invaluable to provide context. Though the author has tried to remain neutral, his opinions do leak out: most of his critical comments are for Gordon Brown, with a few digs at Nick Clegg. I failed to notice any criticism of David Cameron at all, or indeed any Conservatives.

http://rmc28.dreamwidth.org/414583.html… (mais)