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Obras de Proclus

The Theology of Plato (1985) 37 cópias
Inni 3 cópias
theologie 1 exemplar(es)
Commentaire sur le Timée, tome 2 (1998) 1 exemplar(es)
I manuali 1 exemplar(es)
Himnos y epigramas (2003) 1 exemplar(es)
The Six Books of Proclus Volume II (2015) 1 exemplar(es)
Procli Hymni 1 exemplar(es)
Théologie platonicienne 1 exemplar(es)
Sphaera 1 exemplar(es)

Associated Works

The Six Enneads (1952) — Autor, algumas edições700 cópias

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Conhecimento Comum

Data de nascimento
412-02-08
Data de falecimento
485-04-17
Sexo
male
Nacionalidade
Turkey
Locais de residência
Athens, Greece
Educação
Plato's Academy

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Resenhas

> Des Places Edouard. Proclus. Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon.
In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 66, fasc. 1, 1988. Antiquité - Oudheid. p. 125. … ; (en ligne),
URL : https://www.persee.fr/doc/rbph_0035-0818_1988_num_66_1_6933_t1_0125_0000_2

> « La connaissance
de nous-mêmes doit
précéder tout autre
problème et, pour ainsi
dire, toute la spéculation
philosophique…
»
—Proclus, Sur le premier Alcibiade de Platon, (412-485).
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Joop-le-philosophe | Dec 5, 2022 |
This book was incredibly long. I'm not sure that it added anything novel to what Proclus had detailed elsewhere. I may have simply missed it, but all essential points of his system seem to be laid out in his Platonic Theology and his Metaphysical/Theological Elements. He does go into a little more detail as to how he interprets the eternity of the cosmos. This is one aspect of Neo-Platonism that I have consistently rejected. Proclus uses words like "fabricate" and "cause" in reference to the Demiurge (he is usually portrayed as a fabricator by the Neo-Platonists), but these terms are complete misnomers. The cosmos always existed according to Proclus, so his fabricator never really fabricates anything; nor is he the "cause" of anything in the strictest sense of the word. A cause must be followed by an effect, but in Proclus' system, cause and effect can only be figurative terms because they cannot denote chronology or consecutive order. I cannot accept that Plato was this ambivalent with his use of terminology, e.g. "Demiurge." I remain unconvinced by Proclus' attempts to try to distinguish his version of a perpetual universe from Aristotle's version. He does attempt to distance himself from Aristotle and his followers when it comes to this subject, but to me, it's simply a semantical difference. I certainly am open to anyone who would like to show how there is a practical and/or substantive difference between the two approaches, I just don't see it.

The good points about this work should be noted. This is one of the oldest extant commentaries on this Platonic dialogue. Admittedly, Calcidius' commentary is older, however; and if one accepts Plutarch's works dedicated to this dialogue as commentary, his would have to be considered the oldest. The element that Proclus' commentary has that these previous ones lack, is a wealth of extracts (often in the form of quotations) from vanished works. Proclus quotes the Chaldean Oracles a plethora of times. He also quotes the Orphic literature about the same amount. It is also noteworthy that he refers to other Neo-Platonists regularly. References to other philosophers are often only to their positions and rarely does he provide something even approaching near quotes, but it still qualifies as solid evidence of what these philosophers actually believed and taught. One has to keep in mind that some references are polemical and are coming from a biased source. Proclus is undeniably an adherent of the Neo-Platonism of Iamblichus and Syrianus (Proclus' own teacher), and whether he is giving a fair appraisal of some of the philosophers he is opposing (e.g. Porphyry) is at least contestable, but I would wager his references are probably accurate. I find it interesting that in all of Proclus' works where he often quotes the Orphic and Chaldean literature, I can't remember a single reference to the Hermetica. Any conclusions about this would be an argument from silence; still, I find it somewhat inexplicable. It's possible that Proclus found the Hermetica to be as late and as philosophically irrelevant as the Gnostic literature.

One should keep in mind that for the late Neo-Platonic schools, the three dialogues of Plato that were considered to be only for advanced students, e.g. Philebus, Parmenides and the Timaeus, were also considered the zenith of Platonic theology and metaphysics. We are lucky enough to have commentaries for all three. Two from the pen of Proclus (him representing the school and systems of Iamblichus and Syrianus); and the other from the pen of Damascius, who was the last of the prominent late Neo-Platonists from the same school. Given how important these dialogues were to the Neo-Platonic schools, having commentaries for them is a benefit for those interested in Hellenistic Philosophy and this branch of it in particular.

For some of the above elements alone, Proclus' commentary is well worth reading. That is if one can actually wade through the whole of it without becoming exhausted by the Proclusian monotony. I'm sure this was meant to be broken into smaller volumes and probably was originally intended to be read as supplementary to lectures. I commend the editor/publisher for putting it out in a single volume, but it also makes it a cumbersome book to handle and read from cover to cover. The book is physically large and every page is dense with text, and when one includes Thomas Taylor's notes, this book is over 700 pages. It's worth the slog if one is up to it. There are some regularly typos and the Greek terms are transliterated when provided at all.
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Erick_M | Aug 27, 2018 |
I definitely think Proclus is interesting. It is apparent after reading what remains of his teacher Syrianus that he was dependent on him for a considerable amount of the system he developed; but Proclus still remains the most systematic and comprehensive addendum to Platonic thought.

The Neo-Platonic academies had a very precise order that they followed when studying and lecturing on philosophical texts. Aristotle was important, but mainly as an introduction to Plato. He was followed by some of the less metaphysical dialogues of Plato. The courses ended with Philebus, Timaeus and the Parmenides. The last two being seen as the absolute culmination of Platonist theology.

Parmenides is an interesting dialogue. Different eras of Platonists interpreted it in different ways. Some have theorized that Plato was simply parodying Parmenides' work. I don't believe this. I think Plato was inspired by it, but also departed from it. Clearly, Parmenides' work (as is made evident in the portions of it that have survived) equated the One (to hen) with Being (to on). Plato makes the One transcendent (i.e. above/beyond Being) in his version. Proclus follows Plato in this. To work around the obvious contradiction between Plato's One and Parmenides' One, Proclus claims that Parmenides was only interested in the One that was equated to Being and not the One that transcended it.

I absolutely agree that there is an aspect of the One that is transcendent. My issue with Proclus and other Neo-Platonists is that they have nullified any real active Unity in their attempt to make the One absolutely transcendent and failing to allow an aspect of It that is imminent. Proclus uses terms like "cause" and "create" when discussing the One's relationship to the lower modalistic orders, but this is problematic when seen in the context of his insistence on the absolute removal of the transcendent One from the One of Being (i.e. the imminent One). If the transcendent One is the "cause" or "creator" of the lower orders, how is this accomplished when it is absolutely separate? One cannot insist on negation and separation and at the same time claim a positive unifying presence. If the transcendent One unifies all lower orders, it must be positive and active. Where is the interface between this transcendent One and the lower modalities? Proclus denies activity to the One as well as any positive relationship between It and the One of Being. Proclus' One really remains divorced from all lower orders. He divides up the One into orders and then ultimately cuts off the head of those orders. His One of Being and his henads and monads are a plurality without actual cohesion. He often repeats that all the lower orders strive for the rest and Unity of the transcendent One, but this must be a striving in vain. That One remains completely removed from any relationship with the lower orders. Proclus may contradict this at times and claim that all lower orders gain an intuitive knowledge of the One, but this cannot at all be said consistently of his transcendent One who is far beyond any potential interface with lower orders. If there is no interface with the lower modalities, then the transcendent One can have no real relationship with them. Of course, there are going to be paradoxes when one deals with metaphysical issues at this level, but the paradoxes must at least be consistent and make practical sense.

I want to discuss briefly Proclus' relationship to Christian Mysticism. I don't think it can be legimately denied that the Pseudo-Dionysius was inspired by Proclus--and especially by this commentary. The Pseudo-Dionysius has been given significant credit for the apophatic mystical influence in later Christian mystical thought. Correct Christian mystical theology must balance kataphatic and apophatic theology though. The Pseudo-Dionsysius did not balance these as well as various Christian mystics that followed him. There is also an undue credit that Platonism and Neo-Platonism receives when it comes to apophatic mystical theology. Judaism itself understood that there was an aspect of God that was transcendent. Judaism dealt with this more allegorically though; notable verses are Exodus 33:20; Isaiah 5:8-9, etc. This approach was certainly found early in Christianity (e.g. 1 Timothy 6:16; John 1:18, 6:46, etc). You find interesting indications of this apophatic thought in midrash and Christian apocrypha too. According to Jewish midrash, God created the world with the letter bet (as in bereshith, the first word of Genesis). This inspired some interesting interpretations in Christian apocrypha. The Infancy Gospel of Thomas, for example, provides a mystical parable inspired by the preceding midrash. To quote the passage for the sake of example and illustration:

"A CERTAIN schoolmaster named Zacchæus, standing in a certain place, heard Jesus
speaking these things to his father.
2 And he was much surprised, that being a child, he should speak such things; and after a few days he came to Joseph, and said,
3 Thou hast a wise and sensible child, send him to me, that he may learn to read.
4 When he sat down to teach the letters to Jesus, he began with the first letter Aleph;
5 But Jesus pronounced the second letter Beth, Gimel, and said over all the letters to him to the end.
6 Then opening a book, he taught his master the prophets: but be was ashamed, and was at a loss to conceive how he came to know the letters.
7 And he arose and went home, wonderfully surprised at so strange a thing."

Another version of the infancy gospel has this:
"Thereafter they took Him to another and a more learned master, who, when be saw Him, said: Say Aleph. And when He had said Aleph, the master ordered him to pronounce Beth. And the Lord Jesus answered him, and said: First tell me the meaning of the letter Aleph, and then I shall pronounce Beth."

Jesus first responds and only says beth and the following letters and then responds in silence to the teaching of the beth and he demands that the teacher first explain aleph. This is of course because the Aleph represents the transcendent One, while the Beth represents the One in His imminence, i.e. in His creative activity. The revelation that Moses was ultimately known for is God revealing Himself as the I Am (i.e. as Being itself). This dichotomy of God in His imminence and in His transcendence is a consistent dynamic in the Old Testament and continues into the New.

The apophatic strain of mysticism was certainly intuited in Judaism parabolically and was found early on in Christianity. The big difference between Platonist apophaticism and Christian apophaticism is that Christianity admits a Trinitarian Godhead. This is something that Platonism, and certainly Neo-Platonism, denies. The Trinity accords to God His imminence and His transcendence jointly. Proclus divides Being from the One, whereas Christianity, Unites them. In fact, Christianity in a sense negates the Divine negation and posits Divine activity in its place. Proclus not only puts the creative aspect of Divinity far down the modal hierarchy (i.e. in the demiurgic level), he puts activity itself down a number of steps as well. Jesus says of the transcendent Father that He is still working (ergazotai) and so Jesus Himself works (ergazomai). Jesus unites this transcendent and imminent working/activity in Himself. Proclus puts the realm of forms (eidos) down the hierarchical ladder as well; whereas Jesus said that the Father has a form (eidos) that has not been seen (John 5:37). That Eidos is, of course, the Logos. The Logos is the transcendent Father in His imminence. Jesus also says quite plainly that He and the Father are One (hen esmen) in John 10:30. That Jesus also equated Being with God and the One is made apparent when He calls Himself the I Am (John 8:58).

It is interesting that Neo-Platonism has gained such a reputation as being a primary influence on Christian mysticism when it approaches mysticism quite differently. Neo-Platonism, and specifically Proclus, divides the transcendent aspect of God from any practical imminence; instead, it posits a plurality of henads, monads, gods and demons. Ultimately all the orders are hopelessly separated from the transcendent God, and, thus, He is separated from human beings, who are far down Proclus' hierarchy.

I give Proclus philosophical credit, but I must also reject his theology as absolutely impractical and pointless. I would give Proclus more credit than I would give some forms of eastern philosophy that teach a theistic nihilism, but it’s still ultimately a suboptimal theistic system.

This was a work that did cause me to do some reflection, so that makes it recommendable. I can’t see recommending it without giving my position though.
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Erick_M | Aug 27, 2018 |


Out of the later Neo-Platonists (i.e. post Plotinus), I think that Proclus is probably the most interesting and the most systematic and novel. I say "probably" because a number of the works of Iamblichus and Porphyry are no longer extant, so it is difficult to reach an absolute conclusion as to what their systems consisted of. There is no question that Proclus was influenced by both of them, but he seems to have been more systematic than either.

Proclus has been regarded by scholars as having had an indirect affect on Christian mysticism, so I have had an interest in reading him for some time. He is regarded as the ultimate source behind the system of the Pseudo-Dionysius. After reading this, I can definitely see that being the case to a degree. In truth, though, Christian mysticism has always utilized the language of Platonism. It would be a mistake to say that there weren't differences, however. Differences are notable even in this work. While Christian mysticism accepted the negative theology (i.e. apophaticism) of Neo-Platonism, it's in the positive theology (i.e. kataphaticism) of Christian mysticism where one finds the most pronounced differences. One of the factors that plays into this is Platonism's theology of the One. In both Platonism and Neo-Platonism, the One is transcendent and above being, and thus, a purely negative theological component. This is in contrast to Christianity where the New Testament has set the standard of the One as being imminent and also synonymous with "being" (Greek: to on) in it's essence (ousia). It's also one of the differences I have personally had with Platonism. I feel that for a One to be a sign of all consequent unity, it must also be imminent and an actual component of being. I think Platonism's focus on the negativity of absolute transcendence seems to relate more to Zero than to One. This does bring up the interesting discussion of what exactly the theological relationship is between Zero and One. I won't explore that here though. Suffice it to say that this question relates to Christianity's insistence on a Divine Trinity.

What was nice about this edition of Proclus' Metaphysical Elements (also called Elements of Theology in the Dodds edition) is that the editor/translator has provided a very helpful diagram for reference. Proclus' theosophy (I think one can legitimately call it that) seems to have a strong similarity to Kabbalah (one can hardly doubt Kabbalism's dependence on Neo-Platonism, Hermeticism and Gnosticism anyway). The break down of Proclus' system of emanations is a triadic aggregation. The system of emanations has it's hyparxis in the One ultimately, although the One can not be the source of direct participation. After the One is where the triadic model begins. Subsequent to the One is the unfolding of plurality. "Being" is at the top most rung of the triadic system, followed by "beings" and "life"; then proceeds "lives" and "intellect"; then "intellects" and "soul"; then "souls" and "body"; and then "bodies" and "matter." It seems that the forms (eidos) unfold from an undifferentiated unity somewhere in the hyparxis, but where exactly I don't think Proclus addressed directly in this work.

It seems fairly plain that no composite being can have any kind of relationship with Proclus' One. The best they can hope for is a relationship with the cosmic deities (e.g. Zeus, Apollo, etc). In the end, Proclus' negative theology wins out and the One God remains absolutely transcendent and unreachable. While the Pseudo-Dionysius does contain a lot of those apophatic elements, Christian mysticism is the most valid (not to mention Christian) only when it seeks to balance apophatic with kataphatic theology. The best Christian mystics did this successfully. Pseudo-Dionysius still struggled with this; Tauler, Ruusbroec, Suso, etc, were superior in this regard.

This edition is based on the translation of Thomas Taylor--although Thomas Johnson (a notable follower of Taylor's and a theosophist also) made some emendations of the text of Taylor's. Johnson also provided the fragments of Ammonius Saccas and also provided a useful diagram, as I mentioned above. He also provided some notes from Taylor and others that are elucidative. I don't have any complaints about the edition.

To sum up, I think this work of Proclus is incredibly interesting. I've mentioned some of my main issues with it, and if one keeps those in mind, I have no problem recommending Proclus as a noteworthy philosopher. He is also probably the most important Neo-Platonist after Plotinus.
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Erick_M | Aug 27, 2018 |

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