W. G. F. Jackson (1917–1999)

Very solid offering on the North Africa campaigns. He says that the British Army was tribal in that they had tight regimental affiliations, whereas average Germans were more professional in serving in a variety of units.
He really speaks to the realities of the situation, addressing unit readiness and status of training.

More of a strategic handling of the North African campaigns, and definitely slanted towards the British participation. Scant info on American contributions. Dozens and dozens of maps, which I found to be really helpful.… (mais)

There are very few books about this part of WWII, as the glory departs to Normandy for Overlord. But to the real student there is a lot to be found here; 1) the influence of air power in this campaign where the traditional ratio of 3:1 in ground power was severely modified by practice when the almost complete absence of German airplanes led to a ground troop ratio of close to 1:1 allowing Allied advances. 2)an explanation of the Allies failure to use their opportunities in the Balkans, leading to considerable cold War problems, and 3) the difficulties of running a very mixed Allied Army. there's also the discussion of the Greek civil War in 1945-47.
Sadly, the maps are not as good quality as the earlier volumes and the photographs are also not to be found...sigh, so it's better than nothing.… (mais)

As WWII winds down, it was interesting to visit a side-show that had enormous potential. Though the Americans always dismiss the Med. as a distraction from the Normandy campaign, Cold Warriors were full of regret about the possible Balkan investment that America shunned in 1944-45. An Albania with a democratic government, A Yugoslavia more firmly in the Western camp, a Greece with less strife than the post-war period provided? All good things, but instead there was the "Dragoon" landings in the South of France. They occurred on August 15th 1944.
The St.Lo breakout had started July 25, and by the time the Allies started north up the Rhone, the battle of the Falaise Gap was in full swing. If the Allied troops used in these landings had stayed in Italy, then it was very likely they would have been in Western Yugoslavia by the winter of 1944/45. Admittedly the strategies in this volume advance the British Case, but it is still a very enticing picture for the WWII historian.
Very regrettably due to economy, the maps in this volume are quite disappointing.… (mais)