Thomas S. Edrington

Thomas Edrington and John Taylor worked at Sandia Labs and were “avocational” (from the jacket blurb) Civil War historians. Their book on the Battle of Glorieta Pass has the clearest explanation of the battle I’ve seen, even in professional histories.


The discussion of the work up to the battle is fairly straightforward and not all that different from other histories. General Henry Sibley’s Texans marched up the Rio Grande, scattering ineffectual Union troops until they got to Valverde. They won at Valverde, too, but failed to take Fort Craig and bypassed it, leaving Colonel Canby and a considerable Union garrison in their rear. Sibley remained in Albuquerque, where he reportedly found solace in tequila; Colonel William Scurry continued on to Santa Fe, then headed east through Glorieta Pass.


In the meantime, Colonel John Slough and the Colorado Volunteers were marching south from Denver. They had orders from Canby to remain at Fort Union but the Volunteers grew restless and more or less forced him to advance; his orders did allow a little discretion and he took a lot. Thus, the Colorado troops entered Glorieta Pass from the east at roughly the same time the Texans were entering on the west.


It’s now necessary to do some topographical background; Edrington and Taylor do an excellent job here, which is one of the things that makes this a superior history.


* Glorieta Pass is the name of the entire passage through the Sangre de Cristos Mountains, and is about 40 miles long.

* Apache Canyon is the name of a particularly narrow part of the pass, perhaps 2000 feet long.

* There were three ranches spaced along the pass; the easternmost belonged to Napoleon Kozlowski.

* The middle ranch belonged to Alexander Valle, whose nickname was “Pigeon”; and thus was known as Pigeon’s Ranch.

* The westernmost ranch belonged to Anthony Johnson.


Thus, while the whole three day battle was The Battle of Glorieta Pass, there were various encounters spread along its length; thus there was a Battle of Johnson’s Ranch, a Battle of Apache Canyon, and a Battle of Pigeon’s Ranch. (There was no battle of Kozlowski’s Ranch, but the Union forces camped there).


The first encounter was between advance forces under Major John Chivington of the First Colorado Volunteers and Major Charles Pryor of the Second Texas Mounted Volunteers, at the western end of the canyon (and the Battle of Apache Canyon). Edrington and Taylor illustrate the action on topographic maps, with symbols for infantry (20 men), cavalry (20 troopers) and cannon (individual guns). The Coloradans outflanked the Texans, moving behind a handy bluff, and forced them back, but the day was running down and they were reluctant to pursue from fear of ambush. The Texans retreated toward their main body in the direction of Santa Fe; the Coloradans retreated toward the main Union body at Pigeon’s Ranch.


The next day both forces were there in full strength and under commanders Scurry and Slough (although Slough stayed well in the rear). Although the Texans were outnumbered and outgunned, they seized a ridge enfilading the Union line and sharpshooters began picking off Union officers and gun crews. The Coloradoans began to lose morale and started backing up; eventually this didn’t quite become a rout but it wasn’t actually a well-organized retreat either. Slough had two units of Regular cavalry in reserve, but for never-explained reasons never used them; it isn’t clear if he just forgot about them or if he gave them orders to attack and they refused. At any rate, this time it was the Confederates who failed to pursue because of falling darkness. However it was a pretty clear Confederate victory.


Except it wasn’t. Early in the day Slough had sent Major Chivington up and over Glorieta Mesa, where he was supposed to descend on the Confederate rear. This was one of the reasons Slough held in position so long; he was expecting Chivington to show up at any minute and trap the Confederates.


Slough and Chivington were amateur soldiers, and amateurs tend to make overly complicated battle plans, and that’s what happened here; Chivington’s unit was a substantial part of Slough’s strength and Slough had detached him to go off on a wild goose chase over forbidding terrain where he was completely out of the battle. As it happens, though, amateurs sometimes have beginner’s luck. In this case Chivington’s and Slough’s luck was Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Chaves of the Second New Mexico Volunteers, who happened to have scouted out the area during the Mexican-American War (when he was on the Mexican side). He brought Chivington to the edge of the mesa, looking down at the Texan supply train at Johnson’s Ranch. The Coloradans scrambled down the mesa slope, to the amazement of the Texans, brushed aside the small guard, burned the wagons and stampeded or bayonetted the mules. (This was more or less at the same place as the first day’s battles, but it generally called the Battle of Johnson’s Ranch rather than the Second Battle of Apache Canyon).


Chivington thought about heading up the canyon to catch the Confederates from behind – which is what he had been ordered to do – but again figured that it was getting dark and he didn’t really know what was waiting for him up there and decided to head back up and over the mesa. This was mostly done in total darkness; fortuitously a local man, Alexander Grzelachowski showed up (riding a snow-white horse, to boot) and guided them back to the Union camp. Chavez knew Grzelachowski and vouched for him; Grzelachowski took them by a road even Chavez didn’t know about.


Thus, the Confederate triumph at Pigeon’s Ranch was outbalanced by the Confederate disaster at Johnson’s Ranch. Without supplies, Scurry took his troops all the way back to Santa Fe (and eventually met with Sibley who took them all the way back to Texas); Slough resigned his commission (the Coloradans were dissatisfied with his “leading from the rear” style to the extent of firing shots at him now and then. Although he wasn’t the senior officer, Major Chivington took over by acclaim and became Colonel Chivington.


Edrington and Taylor close by discussing the long-term implications of the battle. They acknowledge it’s sometimes called “The Gettysburg of the West” (in fact that’s the subtitle of the book) but note there’s no real comparison other than the fact that both battles took three days; the troops numbers at Glorieta were about 1% of those at Gettysburg. Several other histories I’ve read note that more gold and silver came out of Colorado each year than the entire four-year budget of the Confederacy and therefore argue that a Confederate advance after victory at Glorieta could have taken them all the way to Denver and looting on a grand scale. Edrington and Taylor dismiss this, pointing out that the country this advance would go through was destitute of supplies for an army. (Slough and the Coloradans had done it in the other direction, of course, but they had the enormous military depot at Fort Union waiting for them and could replenish there; it would have taken epic Union incompetence to allow the Confederates to capture Fort Union with its supplies intact).


Most of the battle took place within earshot of the ruins of Pecos Pueblo, now a National Historic Site. (Which is where I picked up this book). What’s left of the Glorieta battlefield has been recently added to the park, and there’s a walking trail; unfortunately I didn’t visit it this spring because I didn’t know it was there.


Numerous illustrations; pictures of the participants plus lots of maps. Orders of battle for both sides in an appendix. Endnotes and an extensive bibliography. Good job by the authors.… (mais)