R. L. DiNardo

The more I read about the Nazi war effort, the more amazed I am that they managed to get anything done at all, much less do as well as they did. Germany and the Axis Powers discusses relations between the Reich and Italy, Rumania and Hungary, with a little about Finland and nods to Bulgaria, Slovakia, Croatia and Japan. This is a diplomatic history, and only a military one in the sense that it’s necessary to know a little about the military situation in order to understand the diplomacy.


Hitler’s basic attitude toward foreign relations with the Axis Allies was one-on-one diplomacy, concluding separate pacts with Mussolini, Horthy, and Antonescu. There was no overall “Axis” command; at best, liaison officers from the Wehrmacht were attached to each foreign army, and vice versa. This allowed each of the Axis powers to essentially conduct its own parallel war, with little or no coordination with the Germans. As a result, each of the allies had its own war aims, which were territorial aggrandizement or reclaiming territory lost to the Soviets in 1939-1940.


This is most pronounced in the cases of Finland and Rumania, each of which was content once lost territory had been regained, without, incomprehensibly, bothering to realize that if the USSR was not defeated it might have some future objections. If Finland, for example, had allowed German assaults on Leningrad or the Murmansk railway – even if it didn’t contribute any troops itself – things might have gone differently on the Eastern front; and the Romanians and Hungarians spent more time worrying about each other – with Rumania wanting to reverse the Vienna Award and Hungary wanting to hang on to it – than worrying about the USSR, until it was too late. (At one point, a Hungarian division in the Ukraine pulled out of the line and repositioned itself to block a Rumanian division moving up to the front, and things were only smoothed over by moving an Italian division between them).


Italy had the opposite problem; rather than commit its entire armed forces to the African campaign, Mussolini sent an entire Italian army – lavishly equipped, at least by Italian standards – to the Russian front, just to be “in on the kill” and even though it had not been requested by the Germans. Things might have been different in North Africa as well if the Italian Eighth Army had turned up there instead of in the Ukraine, especially since Rommel was the only German commander who was able to work effectively with the Italians.


The saddest case is probably Hungary. Admiral Horthy wasn’t even told about Barbarossa until the day before the attack was launched, then he was expected to contribute troops to the operation, even though Hungary had no territorial losses to recoup from the USSR. To Horthy and Hungary’s lasting credit, they resisted Eastern Front atrocities with all possible vigor, with Hungarian troops smuggling Jews away from the Einsatzgrüppen and Horthy refusing to participate in roundups in Hungary. (Tragically, Horthy was deposed by a pro-German coup in the last months of the war – with his son kidnapped by Otto Skorzeny and sent to Mauthausen just to make sure he stayed deposed – and the SS was able to round up Hungary’s Jews and ship them to Auschwitz).


I also think Finnish policy was principled. Unfortunately, principles didn't get you all that far with Stalin; Finland was lucky.


All the Axis minors seemed to have roughly the same attitude - pick up some territory, then sit back and watch Germany get on with the business of defeating the USSR. With the blessing of hindsight, it would have been better to either stay out of the war or go all out. Or maybe not - I don't think the USSR would have lost even if the Finns had cut the Murmansk railway or allowed the Germans access to Leningrad from the north. Similarly, if Hungary (for example) had stayed neutral, it's very unlikely that Stalin would not have taken it over anyway. The whole thing has the tragic inevitability of a Greek drama.


The Germans didn’t help matters any by refusing to sell or transfer designs – notably aircraft and automobile engines – to any of the other Axis powers. Thus, although Italians, Hungarians, Finns and Romanians were as good or better than the Soviets in 1941, things changed quickly. Italy did receive some obsolete Ju87s, and the Hungarians got a couple dozen PzIVs, but that was it – it would have made much more sense to let them build equipment themselves.


Quite interesting and well referenced, although wouldn’t recommend it to anybody that didn’t already have a thorough grounding in the WWII military campaigns. Eastern front war-game designers would do well to read this book – many games treat the Axis minors as if they are fully compatible with each other and the Germans, and as if they are ready to cross the border as soon as Barbarossa is launched.… (mais)

In Breakthrough: The Gorlice-Tarnow Campaign, 1915 (Santa Barbara, Calif: Praeger, 2010) Richard L. DiNardio covers the decisive battle of the eastern front. In fact, he argues that the Gorlice-Tarnow campaign re-set the war on all fronts in Germany's favor. The Central Powers regained the upper hand that they lost on the Battle of the Marne, and dealt the Russian army a blow that they did not recover from. Unlike Moltke's grand plan to reach Paris in one swift movement, Field Marshal August von Mackensen's plan moved from one objective to the next as a series of independent offensives. The first target was Przemsyl, then Lemberg, and finally Warsaw. Each one fell into their hands more easily than they thought, setting the stage for the next drive east. Unlike the Battle of the Marne, these battles were masterpieces of operational art that utilized the latest technologies, like the telephone. DiNardio has high praises for Mackensen and his staff, and takes a few swipes at General Erich von Ludendorff. Ironically, despite the clear military success of the campaign, it failed in its diplomatic objectives of persuading Italy and Romania to remain neutral. Considering their liabilities to the Allies, that might not have been a total diplomatic defeat for the Germans.

From my blog: http://gregshistoryblog.blogspot.com/2014/08/world-war-i-recent-reads-decisive.h...… (mais)

A fairly close examination of the failures of the German state at the strategic and operational levels of war in regards to cooperating with allies. Some of these failures are more obvious than others, considering the jealous and grandiose approach that Hitler and Mussolini brought to making war, in defiance of the real resources both states could draw upon. Regardless of the contributions of other co-belligerent states (such as Finland, Hungary, and Romania) the failure of Rome and Berlin to engage in serious joint planning meant the squandering of those resources that were available.

That two arrogant military dictators would be unable to subordinate their egos to the greater good is not exactly a surprise. The more subtle question is why the German military seemed to learn no real lessons from their experiences in World War I, which also featured bad coalition cooperation. One would suspect that the political naivete that the German officer corps cultivated was simply another part of their strategic ineptitude. DiNardo touches on this attitude problem, but that he doesn't explore this issue in a bit more depth is why I don't rate this work more highly. Then again, the main focus here is with structural organization, not cultural attitude.… (mais)