Damascius

I think this was definitely worth reading. The Phaedo is an essential Platonic dialogue. It's the primary dialogue where Plato sets out a defense for the immortality of the soul. He does this, of course, through his main interlocutor, Socrates.

Having a commentary on this dialogue by a notable later Neo-Platonist (one of the last, in fact) is probably a good idea for anyone who is into Platonism and/or Neo-Platonism. Damascius attempts a greater defense of the soul-philosophy of the Phaedo in response to various criticisms that appeared in the dialogue itself and also appeared subsequently. He also includes quite a few references to certain aspects of the metaphysical system developed by various earlier Neo-Platonists. He also indicates that there were not always unquestioned agreement on all aspects of this system. It seems there were incidental points that might be disagreed upon, e.g. even though he quotes Proclus as a considerable authority, he doesn't mind rejecting some of his interpretations. It still seems pretty well established and evident that the system developed by Plotinus and continued by Porphry, Iamblichus and Proclus remained intact as to the main points.

As is common with me when I read Neo-Platonist philosophers, I don't find absolute consistency. For instance, a major point of Platonist philosophy is to not only hold that soul is non-composite, it is also held that it is impassible. Damascius appeals to it's impassibility in many of his defenses here. This defense works when he is trying to show that the soul is not subject to the accidents of opposites, e.g. life and death. The soul can experience these states only as far as it's vehicle (i.e. bodily existence) is concerned, but as an ousia (substance/essence), soul is not subject to these contrasting qualities. The soul is life-giving whereas the body is life-receiving, thus the life of the two is disparate. The body can be subject to the removal of the life it is endowed with (i.e. through death), but soul is not subject to this because of it's nature as ousia (i.e. essential life). His defense of impassibility becomes problematic though when he takes into account Plato's position that the soul can be punished in hades. If the soul is impassible, how is it punished? Damascius appeals to the notion of a pneumatic vehicle of the soul that allows this to take place. This does beg the question, however, as to whether the soul experiences (in any way) not only bodily existence in life, but even pneumatic existence in hades. If soul is really and truly impassible, it couldn't experience any of the torments of the body or of the pneumatic vehicle. If the soul experiences nothing of the preceding, it seems to be totally absent as to anything experiential; but this cannot be correct because even Plato accorded to it some experiential propensities. To draw a distinction between experiences seems to be an arbitrary judgment as it stands. This is a problem of consistency and the solution and reconciliation isn't provided here.

I do recommend this work. It did help me to understand further aspects of the late Neo-Platonist system, but it also indicates further problems as well.… (mais)