John Buckley (1) (1967–)

This book was somewhat disappointing, especially after Buckley's earlier 'Monty's Men', 'British Armour in the Normandy Campaign', and especially his similar conference compilation 'The Normandy Campaign, 60 Years On.' Most notable is the highly uneven quality of the authors chosen.

There are numerous typos throughout the book, including some completely incomprehensible sentences. The included maps are good - albeit mislabeled, and somewhat difficult to read due to scale and lack of sharpness in reproduction, This could be exacerbated by a personal issue - I have issues with differentiating red and green, which is a particular problem on several of these maps. I am also not a fan of the high gloss paper selected for this volume. I find it uncomfortable to touch, prone to bright reflections, and practically impossible to write marginal notes upon.

The seventeen chapters are broken down into several thematic groups.
Theme 1) German units and their response to Op MG
* Chap 04 – KG Chill: This was a good chapter, but the lack of translations was irritating
* Chap 08 – Grabner's Assault: Well written, but highly speculative
* Chap 06 – German Replacement Army. Also good. However this and the other two chapters in this theme all attempt to make the case that THIS was THE reason MG failed. Logically at least two of them must be wrong.

Theme 2) Planning and conduct for supporting elements to Op MARKET GARDEN
* Chap 10 – Padres and Chap 11 – Medics. Two very interesting chapters on under-documented aspects of military operations

Theme 3) Planning and conduct of supporting operations
* Chap 07 – 43rd and 50th Inf Divs flanking activities. This is one of the weakest chapters
* Chap 05 – air support. Another weak chapter. This chapter also seeks to assert that THIS was THE reason MG failed.

Theme 04) General airborne issues
* Chap 01 – lessons learned: a good, wide ranging, and interesting essay, but yet again making the case that THIS is THE reason MG failed.
* Chap 03 – Allocation of manpower to the Guards and Airborne: Interesting insight into a self-inflicted, and politically motivated, issue which made the British manpower problems in the last year of war even more difficult to manage.
* Chap 17 – In the shadows of MG: in some ways a repeat of Chap 01, carried forward through to the end of the war. Some good points, but not well tied together.

Theme 05) The wider NWE campaign
* Chap 02 – MG and NWE: Competently rehashes the wide front/narrow front controversy of August and early September, and sets the mounting and planning for MG in the wider context of the campaign. Touches on the issues created by having the airforce in charge of the air plan. A very good overview of the strategic considerations associated with MG, and the controversies that have raged around it ever since.
* Chap 12 – Op GATWICK: good, as you'd expect from Badsey. The essay title is a bit of a misnomer though. GATWICK didn't really seek to 'exploit' MG, I'd class it more a case of 'ok, that didn't work. Now what?'
* Chap 14 – Polish Armoured Division in River Crossings: A highly interesting and well told vignette.
* Chap 15 – Op INFATUATE: good.
* Chap 16 - 4th Canadian Armd Div in the Breskens Pocket: confused and confusing. The author seems to struggle a bit with the function and organisation of military units - for example, inf bns had 3-in mortars, as well as 2-in. Also, there are many words are written about units other than the NB Rangers. A more detailed description of how the unit operated, the C2 arrangements, and so on would have been welcome. What is presented here is little more than a culling of anecdotes from various war diaries. It is a surprise that Graves' book 'the South Albertas' isn't referred to, given the authors complaint about the lack of literature on 4th Armd Div.)

Theme 06) Personal stories from MG
* Chap 09 – Nijmegen: interesting but ... just a rehash? Nevertheless manages to make some interesting deductions about sequencing at north end of bridge, and who probably cut wires to demolitions on the Nijmegen Bridge.
* Chap 13 – Civilians: interesting, but seems reluctant to come to a definite conclusion.

Overall, though, this is an interesting and useful collection of essays, covering many aspects of the operation and wider campaign which are often overlooked.… (mais)

A really excellent synthesis of the New Operational Military History as it relates to the way of war in 21st Army Group, in which Buckley concludes that this field force "...matched resources with objectives, developed proficient fighting power sufficient to overcome the enemy, and delivered a victory to the British state that has for too long been downplayed by the passage of time."

If Buckley has a particular mission it is to place the undeniable errors and systemic problems of the British Army into proper context and call out a wide range of critics (Liddell Hart, Cornelius Ryan, Max Hastings, etc.) who had political and professional agendas to pursue and in doing so misrepresented the real achievements that were accomplished in victory. If nothing else it's another sign that the legacy of Cold War military historiography, where it was politically convenient to exaggerate the performance of the German military (thus overlooking its professional and moral failings), is being rapidly left behind.

Still, Buckley also leaves one with the sense that much of the animus that has been directed at the British Army and its way of war is due to the resentment and anger that Bernard Montgomery's incompetence (there is no other appropriate word) at social engineering left in its wake, and which has fed into a "black legend" of arrogant poseurs leading unwilling donkeys.… (mais)