Shelford Bidwell (1) (1913–1996)

This 1982 book is a part of publisher Pen and Sword Military Classics series, and it covers the development of infantry, artillery, and armor doctrine in the British Army as it evolved after the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War until the end of World War II. The authors focus on the evolution of firepower, that is the ability to place destructive and/or neutralizing power on a target to achieve some tactical or strategic benefit. In turn, technology affected that evolution, first by the rise of modern fast-firing field artillery and machine guns, and then by the arrival of armed aircraft and tanks.

The text appears in four books, each covering a time period in chronological order. Book 1 covers the period prior to World War I; Book 2 covers World War I; Book 3 covers the between the wars period; and Book 4 covers World War II. The authors also provide an epilogue, endnotes, a bibliography, and an index.

In making their case on the evolution of firepower, the authors pull together various threads that aided (or hindered) the establishment of any kind of doctrine in the modern British Army. There was more to the struggle than simply the age-old conflict between traditionalists and modernists. During the pre-World War I period, the British Army had not been happy with the way the Boer War unfolded, and the Russo-Japanese War showed how technology had transformed the battlefield and the extent to which opponents could inflict casualties on each other. Therein was the start of a true discussion towards British Army doctrine, a discussion that had barely started when the events of Sarajevo in July 1914 headed Europe towards war.

World War I was a tough classroom in which to develop doctrine, and it took more than three years for the British Army to put together the intellectual vigor, the hardware, the command and control system, the training, and the right commanders to properly control firepower to achieve desired results. Part of the issue was the culture within the British Army itself, whose regimental system often was a source of contention in the development of doctrine. However, by the end of 1918, the British Army was a keen instrument of destruction for the Imperial German Army.

The post-World War I world was one where the British Army codified its hard won doctrinal advances; however, Great Britain's ruinous economic conditions forced the British Army into retrenchment. The severe budgetary restrictions and lack of vigorous doctrine development meant that the service devolved into a gentleman's club where sporting events and equestrian prowess meant more to an officer than tactical ability. The fact that this period lasted for a generation meant that the British Army lost much of what it had gained in more than four bloody years on the Western Front.

World War II revived the tactical training and doctrinal development that had been missing during the interwar years. Not all had to be reconstructed from scratch; however, the British Army suffered embarrassing defeats consistently through the end of 1942, paying dearly for the sporting life that had defined the interwar years. Both doctrine and service reorganization developed rapidly under the stress of combat, and the learning curve was not quite as steep as it was during the First World War.

The authors include some analysis of the British Army's post-World War II development, noting that Great Britains reduced economic and political status as well as the development of nuclear weapons had a profound and negative effect on the British Army. Had the authors been able to look forty years into the future, I'm sure they would be shocked to see the state of their beloved institution, now hardly capable of projecting one battalion during an armed crisis.

I really enjoyed the classic British writing style in this book. The authors sometimes take their time getting to the point, but I enjoyed the journey in doing so.… (mais)