Aditya Adhikari

Only real annoyance so far is it doesn't really shed much light on the period between them starting the civil war and them becoming a force who could confront the state. How did they go from having 2 ancient rifles and a tiny force to being able to build their military and confront armed police etc? It's not really explained even though it's emphasised how unimpressive their starting position was. Like there's mention of a couple of villages with long term revolutionary sympathies but that's it.

Otherwise a very good, balanced, considerate guide to the civil war, why it started, what the appeal was, why the state failed, etc. Some fascinating personal stories. The stories of totally indiscriminate killing by the Nepalese army based on snap judgements especially ethnicity are horrible. It doesn't go into massive detail especially on things like the background but that'd be impossible in the space given. It talks about pretty much everything you'd want to know in enough detail that it provides a very good overview of the situation.

After finishing it: wow I found it really depressing just cause of how little was achieved in the end and how it felt like it followed an identical path to the majority of leftist movements of any kind, violent or otherwise. First a couple things that I found truly baffling and can't understand the logic of that the Maoists did
-The group of influential figures who made a large effort to build up Prachanda as a superhuman figure. The leader of the party (Mohan Baidya) even stepped aside so that Prachanda could become leader. In a weird twist Baidya is now the leader of one of the parties that split from the mainstream party in 2012 in protest at its ending of guerrilla warfare. It just seems like such a baffling decision to build up a personality cult like that.
-That there was a large faction supporting the king within the party, enough so that there were even overtures towards right wing monarchists from part of the 2012 split, after they'd become a near irrelevance. It's hard to understand why even while in the midst of the civil war, after the king had seized total power, that this faction still sought a rapprochement with him while they were attacking the army and state personally loyal to him. Apparently when the king offered a power sharing agreement with the Maoists even Prachanda was inclined to accept and it was only when it turned out to be a ruse that they changed their minds and moved more firmly towards an alliance with the parliamentary parties. I sort of understand the idea of building up a nationalism but it's hard to imagine what they thought they were fighting if they thought the parliamentary parties in a country with a suspended parliament were the main enemy.

The story of the Maoists after the peace deal which ended the monarchy and led to the constituent assembly feels so typical: hamstrung by establishment parties that seem to hold all the cards, massive disillusionment from supporters, efforts to establish relatively moderate reform proposals (eg federal system for greater ethnic self government) completely blocked by others while they carry the blame, higher ups accused (probably totally fairly) of corruption and becoming completely out of touch, splits, massive loss of support (even though they gained a lot past their rural based for the first elections), ending up not far ahead of where the whole thing begun. It's really painful to read as someone who cares so much about this stuff and making things better. It's sad that all the disruption to people's lives, the people dead, and things didn't get much further. That's not to say there's nothing - the Maoist demands did bring in a lot of new ethnic parties who were able to get their say in parliament and there was some change to land structures in the countryside although some of that evaporated when the Maoist forces disarmed and left.

I mean it's not like I have any better idea how things could have gone. The book does a really good job of talking through the massive difficulties in the Maoist position - eg their total lack of presence in the urban areas, limitations of guerrilla warfare and no ability to fight past that - as well as their failings (obviously partially down to their position) - authoritarian control over most of their rural bases, sometimes heavy handed punishments up to and including summary executions of people suspected of being spies, lack of ethnic/caste diversity in leadership positions (that led to a lot of ethnic organisations being very suspicious of them), very stringent discipline for most cadre that deprived them of lives when demobbed and that died in large numbers when assaults on fortified positions were tried. The Maoists came out of a specific situation - a semi feudal country where many people were oppressed and exploited through caste, ethnicity and class, where the parliamentary government was incredibly unstable with little interest in improving the position of most of the country while the monarchy intervened often and the country was at the mercy of India and imperialist powers. They gained support for understandable reasons and even imagining an alternate history (say one where the royal massacre that put Gyanendra on the throne didn't happen) it's hard to see the establishment parties magically getting themselves together and producing some good development policy. They were very popular at the first election despite their civil war actions which says something about the other parties. There's no obvious thing you can point to and say "oh yeah this could have avoided civil war, this could have kept the Maoists in power and pushing progressive policies". It's just something that is. The book provides a very good narrative for all this.

Overall really good book on Nepal's recent history I'd recommend but if you're on the left in any way you might find it a bit miserable. Ending with a quote from near the end, from an entry in the party's journal from a disappointed radical party leader just before the split.

"The Nepali people have … had to bear the brunt of the counter-revolution led by parties and their leaders. [At one point in history], the Congress led a revolution and the people supported the Congress. But later, Congress leaders lost faith in revolution and the party surrendered to the old ruling class and the Indian ruling class … The people who had supported the Congress … were thus betrayed. Similarly, between 2028 and 2032 v.s. [1971/72–1975/76], the UML also tried to lead a revolution …, but later the UML also surrendered to the ruling class, and became counterrevolutionary. The people were betrayed again … Today, once again, counter-revolution stalks the Maoist party and its leaders and is pressuring them to deviate from revolution."

"To many Maoists, the biggest betrayal was when Prachanda and Bhattarai agreed to disband the Maoist army by integrating a small number of combatants into the Nepal Army and sending the rest to join the civilian population. After all, Prachanda himself had often repeated Mao’s dictum, ‘Without a people’s army, the people have nothing.’ In September 2011, in a symbolic gesture marking their transition from a rebel group into a democratic party, the Maoists handed over the keys of their weapon containers to the government. ‘I cried for hours that night,’ recalled Samjhana Magar. Her daughter too cried with her and asked, ‘Mother, does this mean that the Maoist party is now finished?"… (mais)